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Contemporary U.S.-European Relations 
]ames M. McCormick 
T HE BUSII ADMINISTRATION'S "WAR ON TERROR" and its implications for U.S.-European relations often evoke contradictory views among Americans. 
On the one hand, they can generate considerable apprehension since Euro-
pean views toward Americans generally-and President Bush in particular-
has been caricatured in a number of unflattering ways. Recall, for example, the 
headline in the British tabloid, the Daily Mirror, immediately after the No-
vember 2004 presidential election: "How can 59,054,087 people be so 
DUMB?" On the other hand, those topics can evoke the considerable affection 
that Europeans have for the American people, if not always for their govern-
ment, in the aftermath of 9/11. Furthermore, the generally warm receptions 
that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Bush received in early 
2005 on their "charm offensive" to Europe and the cooperative efforts over 
Iran more recently reflect the reservoir of goodwill across the Atlantic. 
This chapter discusses the evolution of the Bush administration's foreign 
policy through its first term and the first three years of its second. It then as-
sesses how this evolution has impacted upon European-American relations in 
the recent past and how it may affect the road ahead. Before proceeding, how-
ever, it is appropriate to discuss the meaning of the term "Europe" as used 
throughout this analysis. Generally, the chapter will refer to "Europe" as the 
countries of the European Union (largely prior to its recent expansion to 
twenty-seven nations) and not to the expanded Europe that formed after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall. Of course, there are dangers in grouping all the EU 
countries together; therefore, where appropria te, reference will be made to 
specific European states (e.g., France and Germany) when making particular 
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arguments. Overall, the intent is to focus on the set of European states that 
have traditionally been allies of the United States over the past half-century or 
more but have nevertheless been troubled by American policies in recent 
years. 
The o rganizing themes for this analysis are the twin notions of a conceptual 
gap and an action gap between America and Europe over U.S. foreign policy. 
The former refers to the gap between Europe and America over the assump-
tions that inform U.S. foreign policy; the latter refers to the gap in the policy 
implementatio n of these parties. The so-called war on terror and how it has 
been pursued has been the focal point in dividing America and Europe since 
Bush's inauguration in 2001. It will be the principal reference point in dis-
cussing these gaps. 
The ultimate conclusion will be optimistic. While a conceptual gap will 
likely remain between the foreign policies of western Europe (and much of the 
European Unio n) and America, owing to their different histories and experi-
ences, the gap is narrowing slightly. The action gap between the two sides has 
already narrowed, and is likely to continue to do so. From the American per-
spective, both the conceptual and action gap will narrow because, due to in-
creasing constraints at home and abroad, the Bush admin istration's foreign 
policy options have been reduced. From the European perspective, the action 
gap will likely close more than the conceptual gap, since Europe remains con-
strained by the realities of America's presence and power in global affairs. 
To discuss these gaps and their future, the analysis is organ ized in four sec-
tions. First, the evolving conceptual maps of the Bush administration's foreign 
policy from 200 I to the present will be outlined, including how those concep-
tual maps were manifested in actions, principally over the war on terrorism. 
Second, interspersed in that discussion will be an analysis of how the Bush ad-
ministratio n's views and actions largely parted ways with the modal views of 
the EU countries (and particularly France and Germany) over conducting for-
eign policy, most particularly over the "war on terrorism." Third, the chapter 
will identify and discuss several constraints that both Europe and America 
face and that may narrow both the conceptual and action gaps over the next 
decade or so. Finally, the future of U.S.-European relations will be considered 
together with some practical steps that should be pursued by both sides. 
Differing Conceptual Approaches to Foreign Policy 
Snyder (2004) nicely summarizes the three most prominent theoretical ap-
proaches to understanding international politics and foreign policy today: re-
alism, liberalism, and constructivism (or idealism, as he labeled it). He also 
Tire War 011 Terror and Contemporary U.S. -European Relations 21 I 
identified the "founders" of these approaches, outlined the philosophical as-
sumptions of the "thinkers" associated with them, and discussed some foreign 
policy makers or "doers" who recently exemplified each approach. Interest-
ingly, neither the Bush administration nor the European Union (nor any Eu-
ropean government) was utilized exclusively in any of Snyder's schemas to il-
lustrate these three different approaches. Yet they could have been, since both 
global actors generally represent considerably different conceptual approaches 
toward the conduct of foreign policy. ' Certainly, no nation--either over a 
long period or even in the course of an administration-is likely to rely solely 
on one of these approaches in formulating its foreign policy, a point illus-
trated by Snyder's analysis. The central tendency of a nation's conceptual map 
and its actions, though, often draw more from one approach than the other 
two. In this sense, we can immediately appreciate some differences between 
the United States and the European Union by comparing their modal foreign 
policy approaches. 
The central tendency of the Bush administration is usually depicted as in-
fluenced by realism, and the central tendency of the countries of the European 
Union appears more influenced by liberalism and/or constructivism.2 As 
such, a fundamental conceptual gap between the two has fueled an action gap 
over what policies should be pursued for some time. This gap has widened 
since Bush's inauguration, especially in policies and actions related to the war 
on terrorism in general, and the war with Iraq in particular. 
Yet a fuller assessment of the Bush administration's foreign policy would 
reveal that the administration actually combined several different conceptual 
approaches, and the European-American conceptual gap tended to ebb and 
flow. Initially, for example, the Bush administration embraced a stark form of 
realism in dealing with foreign policy and, notably, did not place an empha-
sis on terrorism. Immediately after 9/ll, though, the administration adopted 
defensive realism (see Zakaria 1998 on this concept) and some elements of 
liberalism, and focused rather singularly on terrorism. As the Afghanistan re-
sponse faded and Iraq was pushed strongly into focus, the Bush administra-
tion tilted back to realism, and particularly unilateral ism. By the start of its 
second term, the administration appears to have embraced elements of a 
liberal-constructivist view with its emphasis on the promotion of freedom 
and democracy. Might this kind of constructivist emphasis be closer to the 
modal European view? Is there some prospect of a real closure in the con-
ceptual gap on foreign policy between America and Europe as a result? Be-
fore attempting to answer these questions, let me expand upon these differ-
ing conceptual approaches of the Bush administration, assess how much has 
changed, and examine how wide the conceptual and action gaps remain be-
tween Europe and America. 
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Conceptual Bases of Bush's Foreign Policy 
Prior to 9/11 
In the period prior to September 11,2001, the Bush administration adopted 
a stark version of classical realism.3 Although George W. Bush did not enter the 
White I louse with much foreign policy experience, he selected a set of advisors 
who were largely classical realists in their approach to American foreign policy. 
Adherents to this approach make some important simplifying assumptions 
about states and foreign policy behavior. They believe that nations are the prin-
cipal actors in foreign policy; actions between states should trump any efforts 
to change behaviors within states. Great powers are more important than other 
powers in managing foreign policy, and states pursue their interests, defined by 
their capabilities, but they should do so prudently and cautiously. By the prin-
ciples of classical realism, the United States would and should aid global stabil-
ity from its position of strength, but-importantly-this would occur in a 
highly prudent and selective manner. To be sure, there was a slight hint of a 
transformational kind of foreign policy that we would soon see. 
From this conceptual perspective, Bush's agenda for action was to be much 
more narrow and unilateralist in focus than even the last years of the Clinton 
administration. That is, Bush would adopt a narrower definition of America's 
interests abroad, emphasize refurbishing America's alliance structure, and deal 
with Russia and China more skeptically than the previous administration. The 
United States also would oppose--or at least not pursue-some actions: (1) it 
would not be involved in trying to change other states internally or create po-
litical democracy within other countries; (2) it would oppose American hu-
manitarian interventio ns without a clear strategic rationale; (3) it would es-
chew invo lvement with international institutions; and (4) it would not be 
constrained by international agreements. Importantly, as with past U.S. ad-
ministrations, the Bush administration would not be inclined to afford much 
influence to the Congress or to allies in the conduct of American foreign pol-
icy. While the issue of terrorism was on the agenda, the actions of key states, 
and particularly great powers, were the real focus of foreign policy attention 
in the administration's early days. With that in mind, the issue of terrorist ac-
tivity was given a relatively low priority. 
The specific policy actions emanating from this conceptual approach are fa-
miliar. In its early months, the Bush administration rejected the Kyoto Proto-
col, withdrew from the International Criminal Court ( ICC), pulled back from 
the Middle East, and initially halted discussions with North Korea. Toward 
Russia, the administration moved to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty and pursued national missile defense. Toward China, it had a standoff 
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for a time over a downed American plane. As Richard Clarke, the counterter-
rorism expert on the National Security Council, has noted in several media in-
terviews, terrorism seemingly was not a top-d.awer issue for the Bush admin-
istration during these early months (see, e.g., CBS News 2004). 
Such an agenda was at a considerable distance from what had become the 
European Union's modal approach with its emphasis on utilizing interna-
tional institutions and seeking to pursue a rule-based international order (see, 
e.g., Daalder 2005: 44-46; Kagan 2003; Lindberg 2005: 5-6). Furthermore, the 
ICC, Kyoto, and arms control were crucial foreign policy issues for Europe. 
The resulting conceptual and action distance between the initial Bush ap-
proach and the European model was accentuated in yet another way: the Bush 
administration's style of interaction (including that of President Bush him-
self) was not always tactful and instead displayed what some would call 
"American arrogance" in its foreign policy pronouncements. For example, the 
Bush administration's blunt rejections of the Kyoto Protocol, ICC, and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty-all issues that had broad support in 
Europe-during its first months in office highlighted this stylistic approach; 
indeed, some of these rejections even occurred on European soil and were too 
often do ne without advancing U.S. alternatives in these policy areas (see Haass 
2005). In short, the Bush adm inistration's foreign policy style further deep-
ened the conceptual and action gaps already in place. 
From 9/ll to the First B!.Jsh Doctrine 
The events of 9/11 had a profound effect on the American public, the Con-
gress, and the Bush administration. The impact was probably more profound 
on America than many at home or abroad have fully recognized. The atrocities 
deeply affected the collective American psyche and changed the direction of the 
Bush administration's foreign policy. This view contrasts with some analyses 
(Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 78-80) that suggest that 9/11 enabled the president 
to actualize foreign policy views that he or his advisors had long held. 
Instead, 9/11 ushered in a different conceptual map within the White 
House. In several ways, of course, the events of 9/ 11 confirmed some of the 
administration's initial assumptions about the world and its approach; for ex-
ample, the importance of "hard" or military power over "soft" or diplomatic 
power (Nye 2004) and the need for enhanced military preparedness. Yet, they 
also underlined the limitation of Bush's commitment to classical realism (e.g., 
not o nly states were important actors in foreign policy, and the internal com-
positio n of states could also be crucial in affecting foreign policy). Thus, the 
events of 9/l l had the twin effects of compelling the administration to pur-
sue a broader internationalist policy than the Bush administration originally 
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envisioned, and of demonstrating that America needed the assistance of other 
states and other international actors in achieving its foreign policy objectives. 
While the president and his administration did not adopt a volte-face in his 
policy approach, they moved from classical realism to defensive realism and 
from rejecting Wilsonian liberalism to incorporating some o f its elements. 
T he role of the neoconservatives, or what Walter Russell Mead (2005: 88-90) 
calls the "Revival Wilsonians," now became more pronounced in the policy-
making process. These advisors, including Vice President Cheney, Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and oth-
ers, pressed to advance American democratic values abroad, even as they es-
chewed the use o f or reliance upon international institutions. Still, and im-
portantly, the commitment to classical realism was never far away, even 
though conceptual changes were clearly discernible. 
Altho ugh defensive realism makes many of the same assumptions as classi-
cal realism, it differs in one important respect: the importance of"insecurity" 
as the motivating force for state actions. Under classical realism, "states ex-
pand because they can" but under defensive realism "states expand because 
they must" (Zakaria 1998: 8-9). Yet the incorporation of liberalism into this 
conservative president's foreign policy went further than defensive realism 
and included components that were largely familiar to many Americans from 
the days o f the Cold War. T hat is, foreign policy moved beyond state-to-state 
relations among the strong to include other international actors, but it also 
sought to advance some universal Wilsonian values (e.g., global freedom). In 
addition, the target of American policy now had a clearer focus, much like the 
Cold War years. The new challenge of international ter rorism resurrected 
moral principle as a guide to policy, a rationale readily fa miliar from Amer-
ica's past (see, e.g., McCormick 2005: 2 1-28; Osgood 1953; Perkins 1962; 
Spanier 1982). Essentially, the administration's new conceptual map focused 
on the actions of all states and groups, became increasingly interested in the 
internal composition of some states (especially as related to terrorism), and 
incorporated a clear moral imperative to guide its action agenda. 
T he policy actions emanating from this conceptual map quickly took a dif-
ferent tack from its first approach. The actions toward the internal situation 
in Afghanistan were, of course, the centerpiece, but American military and 
military advisory units were rapidly sent to several countries (the Philippines, 
Yemen, and Georgia, for instance) to address ethnic and communal conflicts. 
A new interest in regional conflicts (Indian-Pakistani, Israeli-Palestinian, and 
even North and South Korean) developed, and some incipient efforts were 
undertaken to address them. Importantly, differences with major powers (i.e., 
Russia and China) were put to the side as anti-terrorism became the driving 
force for calculating foreign policy action. 
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While the altered Bush conceptual approach in the immediate post-9/11 
period was hardly akin to the modal EU conception of foreign policy, the use 
of international institutions and the reliance on elements of multilateralism 
appeared to resonate strongly with European nations, especially given the 
tragic circumstances of 9/11. Further, the Bush administration's recognition 
that the United States needed to recruit other nations to its cause, the turn to 
international institutions, and the recognition of multiple actors in global af-
fairs undoubtedly struck a responsive chord among European states. Even the 
new American concern with the internal dynamics in some countries met 
with some receptivity. States that adopted a more expansive view of the con-
struction of a nation's foreign policy welcomed the Bush administration's 
considerations regarding how domestic politics and domestic development 
may affect foreign policy, whether that development was in the Middle East or 
South Asia. 
Ultimately, the action agenda between Europe and America narrowed. Arti-
cle V of the NATO pact, "the attack upon one is an attack upon aU," was in-
voked for the first time in history. Virtually all European states pledged their as-
sistance to the United States, and Europe was largely as one in assisting in 
Afghanistan, although there was considerable variation both in size of com-
mitment and the conditions under which European states would allow their 
militaries to operate in that country. The "rally effect" of public opinion after 
9/11 was not just confined to America, but spread across much of Europe as 
well. Even Le Mondeweighed in with its now often-quoted assertion that "[w]e 
are all Americans." In short, if the conceptual foreign policy gap between 
America and Europe remained in the immediate days after 9/11, it surely be-
came less pronounced. More significantly, the action gap between Europe and 
America closed with a unified effort to respond to the events of 9/11. 
However, this conceptual closure was short-lived. It probably lasted only 
through President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address in which the presi-
dent identified the "axis of evil" nations and the American intention to deal 
with them. The speech immediately inspired sharp reactions from European 
leaders, who had a different protocol for dealing with the world and interna-
tional terrorism. Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine of France noted, "[w]e are 
currently threatened by a simplified approach which reduces all problems of 
the world to the mere struggle against terrorism." Javier Solana Madariaga, the 
European Union's first minister for foreign affairs, warned about "the dangers 
of global unilateralism" and the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer 
called the "axis of evil" notion a concept "not in accordance with our political 
ethos" (Scl}warz 2002). 
The conceptual gap deepened as American discussion turned to war with 
Iraq during the summer and into the fall of 2002. The Bush administration's 
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publication of its National Security Strategy statement (or what might be 
called the first Bush Doctrine) in September 2002 further widened the differ-
ences (White House 2002}. In truth, the statement was a little broader and 
more nuanced than has been popularly perceived- its underlying commit-
ment to human dignity and oft-overlooked discussions of trade and develop-
ment, for instance, illustrate its varied areas of consideration- but neverthe-
less most analysts (e.g., Gaddis 2002; c.f. Daalder, Lindsay, and Steinberg 
2002) focused o n the commitment to fighting "terrorists and tyrants" through 
a variety of means and the potential incendiary danger should these states/ 
groups gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Equally signifi-
cant were the invocation of"the option of preemptive actions to counter a suf-
ficient threat to our national security" and the commitment of the Bush ad-
ministration to act unilaterally, if necessary. As the report noted near the end, 
"I i]n exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and in-
terests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when 
our interests and unique responsibilities require" (White House 2002). 
Clearly, the second part of that statement became the operative one in the 
run-up to the Iraq war, and it widened both the conceptual and action rifts 
between America and Europe over fighting terrorism. 
The widening conceptual gap between the two continents was evident in 
the public challenges made by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder during the 2002 
German elections and in the frequent statements in late 2002 and early 2003 
o f President Jacques Chirac of France. However, the gap was especially appar-
ent in the UN Security Council debates in early 2003 over whether WMD ex-
isted in Iraq and the nature of the Iraqi threat. The United States, Britain, and 
Spain in fact circulated a draft UN resolution that found Iraq in "material 
breach" of its obligations under previous UN resolutions and thereby implic-
itly sanctioned approval of military action to enforce UN Resolution 1441 
passed in November 2002. That draft resolution never reached a vote. Several 
Security Council members, led principally by France, which threatened to use 
its veto, indicated that they would not support it. Indeed, France indicated 
that it would not support any Security Council resolution that would lead to 
war, since the international inspection regime had not been exhausted. 
While the government-to-government gap between the United States and 
virtually all European states over Iraq and its relationship to the war on ter-
rorism were widespread, the views of European publics toward the United 
States were now universally as low-or even lower- than at any time since the 
end o f World War II. In March 2003, for instance, the percentage of respon-
dents expressing a favorable view of the United States had fallen to 48 percent 
for Britain, 34 percent for Italy, 25 percent for Germany, 3 1 percent for France, 
and to a remarkably low 14 percent for Spain. By comparison the percentage 
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of respondents expressing a favorable view of the United States in the summer 
of 2002 was 75 percent for Britain, 70 percent for Italy, 61 percent for Ger-
many, and 61 percent for France. A comparable percent for Spain was 50 per-
cent from a 1999-2000 survey. (See Pew Global Project Attitudes 2003: 19 for 
these data.) Such extraordinarily feeble levels of public support for America 
would hardly motivate European elites and government leaders to pursue a 
common policy with the United States. 
Of course, the conceptual gap in the lead-up to the Iraq war was matched 
by an expanding action gap. The "coalition of the willing" constructed to at-
tack Iraq did not include some key European allies, notably France and Ger-
many, although a number of NATO members did contribute in some limited 
way, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Turkey. Further, 
even after Bush declared the cessation of major combat in May 2003, several 
key European states, again including France and Germany, refused to partici-
pate in the reconstruction efforts in Iraq with "boots on the ground." Only in 
late 2003 and early 2004 was there any evidence of closing this action gap. By 
fall 2003, the Europeans and Americans were cooperating on new UN resolu-
tions to address the reconstruction in Iraq. UN Security Council Resolution 
1483 lifted sanctions against Iraq, encouraged other nations to help with re-
construction, and approved a special UN representative for Iraq. UN Security 
Council Resolution 1511 called for a multinational force in Iraq and for the 
development of a timetable to move toward democracy. Still, there were limi-
tations on the extent of cooperation, even outright opposition from some al-
lied countries to sending any forces to Iraq and withdrawal of forces by those 
who did assist the United States. In sum, the action gap may have narrowed a 
little in the post-war Iraq period, but the fissure between many key European 
states and America remained and perhaps, in some instances, deepened. 
After November 2: The Second Bush Doctrine 
After the November 2004 election, the Bush administration yet again sought 
to alter its conceptual map for American foreign policy and for addressing the 
war on terrorism. It is a second Bush Doctrine, if you will. The first hint of a 
change came in a post-election meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
in which President Bush declared that "[in] my second term, I will work to 
deepen our trans-Atlantic [sic] ties to nations of Europe." He also noted that 
stronger ties between Europe and America were vital to the "promotion of 
worldwide democracy" (Stout2004: I, 4). 
The altered conceptual map for America's foreign policy was set out more 
fully in Bush's second inaugural address and in his 2005 State of the Union ad-
dress, but his new secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, also discussed it during 
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her Senate confirmation hearings (U.S. Congress 2005) and during her address 
soon thereafter in Paris (Rice 2005). In President Bush's (2005a} inaugural ad-
dress, he directly linked America's well being with the expansion of freedom 
and liberty around the world. Only by reconstructing the international system 
with these powerful ideas could America and the world be secure. "The survival 
of liberty in our land;' he declared, "increasingly depends on the success of lib-
erty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of 
freedom in the world:' Later in his speech, he added, "it is the policy of the 
United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending 
tyranny in the world." This statement was followed by his State of the Union 
address (2005b} where he also linked America's well being at home with con-
ditions abroad. A principal goal for his administration would be "to pass along 
to our children all the freedoms we enjoy-and chief among them is freedom 
from fear." Part of the speech is worth quoting at length. 
Pursuing our enemies is a vital commitment of the war on terror . . . [but] in the 
long term, the peace we seek will only be achieved by eliminating the conditions 
that feed radicalism and ideologies of murder. If whole regions of the world re-
main in despair and grow in hatred, they will be recruiting grounds for terror, 
and that terror will stalk America and other free nations for decades. The only 
force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred 
with hope, is the force of human freedom (Bush 2005b). 
Furthermore, the Bush administration emphasized that this transforma-
tional foreign policy-or really a constructivist approach to foreign policy-
would not be conducted by military means or by imposition from abroad. In-
stead, it would need to be evoked, or encouraged, by the global community. 
Indeed, Condoleezza Rice at her Senate confirmation hearings was quick to 
outline some new central themes of the administration: to unite, strengthen, 
and spread democracies around the world and to do so through diplomacy. In 
her words, "[w]e must use American d iplomacy to help create a balance of 
power in the world that favors freedom. And the time for diplomacy is now" 
(U.S. Congress 2005}. To be sure, this theme is not entirely new, even for the 
Bush administration. The notion of creating a balance of power favoring free-
do m is straight out of the 2002 National Security Strategy statement and the 
discussion of democracy promotion was a theme that President Bush enunci-
ated in his visit to Britain in November 2003 in which he called for "the global 
expansion of democracy" as a key pillar of American security (Bush 2003). 
At o ne level, of course, the American commitment to freedom, democracy, 
and diplomacy should have been attractive to Europeans, since it seemingly 
connotes a differing emphasis and a different approach by the Bush adminis-
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tration. That is, a focus on individual freedoms and democracy ought to fall 
on receptive ears among all western states and cultures. Yet European en-
dorsements have hardly been deafening. Indeed, there has been some reluc-
tance on the part of European states and peoples to embrace it wholeheart-
edly. The reason is not because of the underlying values that the approach 
represents, but because of the future U.S. policies it might entail. That is, how 
would the emphasis on freedom and democracy be implemented? Is it likely 
to lead to moralizing by the United States and thus an approach that the Eu-
ropeans do not like? Will it produce a messianic mission? Will it produce 
hypocrisy when democratic ideals clash with strategic interests, for example, 
over Saudi Arabia or Egypt? Will it be done collectively, or will the Bush ad-
ministration be too quick to seek to implement this vision through military 
means? Undoubtedly, uncertainty over these questions will serve as important 
constraints on many European countries embracing the new set of American 
values. In this sense, the conceptual gap is less likely to close until the action 
gap on this democracy agenda is bridged. 
At the same time, it is important to emphasize Thomas Friedman's point 
(2004): the war on terrorism is ultimately a war of ideas. The ideas of promot-
ing freedom and democracy are attractive and compelling ones for Americans 
and Europeans. In this sense, both sides of the Atlantic might be expected to 
embrace this approach. If they did, their actions would serve to narrow the 
conceptual difference between the two continents (Dumbrell 2008). 
But there is also another difficulty with this new American approach that 
must be acknowledged. Put bluntly, the message is less the problem than the 
messenger. President Bush and his Texas swagger-and the cowboy imagery 
often used to caricature him-appear at times to overwhelm the transforma-
tional message of freedom and democracy. The sense of trust in the motiva-
tion of America and its leader still needs some work. In this sense, multiple 
emissaries (such as Secretary Rice) with more benign personas are also neces-
sary for the conceptual gap to be narrowed. Almost three years on with this 
democracy initiative, the results are underwhelming. 
Constraints and Incentives for Closing the Conceptual and Action Gaps 
Even if the conceptual gap was to narrow only slightly over U.S. foreign pol-
icy generally and terrorism particularly, powerful international and domestic 
constraints remain, which may motivate both the United States and Europe to 
close the action gap. In other words, certain existing constraints may serve as 
incentives to close the action gap between these two global actors in the near 
term. Some of these constraints result from the common ties that already 
exist, but others are unique to the United States and Europe. 
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First, of course, the United States and Europe are still bound together by a 
set of underlying common values and beliefs that brought them together dur-
ing the Cold War, albeit no longer now with the Soviet Un ion as the lode star 
guiding policy formulation. These common values and beliefs are hardly 
empty notions to the vast majority of Europeans and Americans, particularly 
not to the new European states that have escaped communist rule since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall. How these values should be advanced remain as a source of 
disagreement both within and between Europe and America, but these values 
will undoubtedly continue to serve as incentives for all parties to seek some 
policy accommodations. Second, Europe and America are fundamentalJy tied 
by the significant economic links that serve as the "sticky power" (Mead 2004: 
46-53; Mead 2005: 29-36) between them. Indeed, economic ties remain very 
strong, despite political differences and lingering disputes over access to both 
participants' markets (Drozdiak 2005). Third, the often unspoken levels of co-
operation on terrorism-for example, in the areas of law enforcement, intel-
ligence matters, or the tracking of financial matters-remain in place, even in 
the face of more visible political differences over Iraq and the wider war on 
terrorism. Moreover, the events of March 11,2004, in Madrid and July 7, 2005, 
in London continue to provide very powerful incentives for this kind of 
transatlantic cooperation, as does the cooperation evidenced in arresting sev-
eral individuals accused of planning transatlantic plane bombings in August 
2006 (see Van Natta, Sciolino, and Grey 2006). Furthermore, a European 
Union report argued that, despite denials and diversionary explanations, some 
European countries and the United States have cooperated quite extensively 
on the use of"extraordinary rendition" of captured terrorist suspects (Euro-
pean Parliament 2007). In this sense, these different kinds of "ties that 
bind"-and continue to bind-should be recognized as important contribu-
tory factors in evaluating common ground between America and Europe. Al-
though some have questioned whether the war on terrorism and the Bush ad-
ministration's policies have diminished the importance of the transatlantic 
tics (Daalder 2005), these continuing realities speak for themselves and sug-
gest another conclusion: transatlantic linkages remain crucial building blocks 
for sustained cooperation. 
Constraints on the United States 
Both the United States and Europe have addi tional international and do-
mestic incentives to close the conceptual and action gaps in their relation-
ships. From the American perspective, the constraints on international rela-
tions are quite formidable and have already served as impetuses to try to 
restore credibility and support from its European allies. The most compelling 
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international constraint on the Bush administration may be summarized 
using Nyc's (2004) "soft power" concept. The "soft power" quotient of Amer-
ica and Bush is astonishingly low across the world, particularly in Europe. It is 
extraordinarily difficult to conduct a successful foreign policy whilst being 
viewed with suspicion by so many states; this difficulty is felt acutely in rela-
tion to a war on terrorism that is ultimately predicated on global cooperation. 
Consider the results of the BBC World Service's (2005) post-election poll of 
twenty-two countries (including six from Europe), which surveyed attitudes 
to George Bush's reelection, toward the United States, and toward the Ameri-
can people. Only a majority in two countries, India and the Philippines, and 
a plurality in a third, Poland, viewed Bush's reelection as positive. By wide 
margins, the rest of the nations viewed the president's reelection as "negative 
for peace and security for the world." Similar results were reported for these 
nations' view of the American public, with only a majority in India and the 
Philippines "feeling better toward the American people" after the election. 
Most nations felt less warmly to the American people in the face of Bush's re-
election. To be sure, the negative feeling toward the American people was less 
intense than those expressed toward Bush personally, but it was no less evi-
dent (BBC World Service Poll 2005). The Pew Global Attitudes data results 
from March 2004 point to the crux of the issue. For instance, on the question 
of how much the interests of other nations are taken into account when 
America decides its policy actions, only 36 percent of British citizens reported 
believing that America considers the interests of others "a great deal" or a "fair 
amount" in its foreign policy actions. Results from Germany and France were 
even lower, at 29 percent and 14 percent, respectively (Pew Research Center 
2005). Based on these kinds of evaluations of the Bush administration, lead-
ers in these countries and in other European states have little incentive to close 
the action gap since, as Prime Minister Blair discovered in the 2005 British 
elections, such actions may prove costly at home (Dumbrell 2008). 
More recent po!J results among European publics have not held more en-
couraging news for America. By April 2006, tl.c percentage of Europeans with 
a favorable view had improved only modestly, a full three years after the start 
of the Iraq war. At that juncture, for example, 56 percent of Britons, 39 per-
cent of the French, 37 percent of the Germans, and 23 percent of the Spanish 
expressed favorable opinions of the United States (Pew Global Attitudes Pro-
ject 2006). In a BBC World Service poll reported in March 2007, the world-
views of America continued to be largely negative in a survey of twenty-six 
countries (excluding the United States). Among the nine European countries 
surveyed, the percentage of the public with a "mainly positive" view of the 
United States' influence ranged from 12 percent in Greece to 38 percent in 
Poland, with Germany (at 16), Russia (at 19), France (a t 24), Portugal (at 29), 
222 james M. McCormick 
Great Britain (at 33), Hungary (at 29), and Italy (at 35) between those two 
(BBC World Service Poll 2007). Significantly, too, the German Marshall 
Fund's "transat lantic trends" survey in 2007 reports that European support 
across a broad array of countries for American leadership had dropped to an 
average of 36 percent, a dramatic decline from a 64 percent level in 2002 (Re-
ported in Applebaum 2007). 
The implication of these results in the present global environment is (and 
has been) that the Bush administration will not be able to gain much traction 
or support for its policy without making some adjustments. If it does not, it 
will become increasingly isolated, unilateralist, and ineffective. Virtually by 
definition, as noted above, an anti-terrorism policy, reliant as it is on interna-
tional cooperation at various levels, cannot be sustained without the attrac-
tiveness of America's soft power and without the continued support of others. 
This kind of isolation is particularly problematic when a U.S. administration 
seeks to construct a new regional or global environment, let alone win Fried-
man's war of ideas. Improving America's soft power, especially among Amer-
ica's principal allies, therefore, seems vital if these foreign policy gaps are to be 
addressed. A reduction in the degree of negative sentiment toward the United 
States generally and toward Bush personally must be sought. The more con-
ciliatory U.S. policy messages-conveyed in 2007 by multiple messengers and 
some recent actions such as talks with Syria and Iran and a successful U.S.-EU 
summit-are a start in addressing this issue. And an undersecretary of state 
for public diplomacy represents a move in the direction. Yet, such actions will 
need to be sustained and amplified to produce any attitudinal change among 
European publics and beyond. Ultimately, though, policy change will be 
needed as well. 
At home, the Bush administration also faces real constraints in several dif-
ferent, but often complementary, ways. Tangible structural constraints exist 
that preclude the use of the American military in other places at the present 
time. As the events of 9/11 and the results of the November 2004 presidential 
reelection have receded into the background, and as the full implications of 
the Democrats' regaining control of the Congress in the 2006 elections sink in, 
congressional constraints on future military interventions by the Bush ad-
ministration seem more likely. Looming over structural and institutional con-
straints faced by the Bush administration, and actually amplifying them, is the 
continuing situation in Iraq. Furthermore, public opinion is a stronger con-
straint than ever. Its effect is evidenced by the 47.4 average job approval rat-
ing for President Bush in his eighteenth quarter in office (April-July 2005), 
one of the lowest job approval ratings for recent presidents in comparable 
quarters (Jones 2005a) and it has dropped since then. By late 2005, for in-
stance, Bush's public approval rating feU below 40 percent briefly and re-
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mained in the low 40 percent range at the end of the year (Moore 2005). In 
2006, the president's approval stayed in the high 30 percent range during 
much of the year. In the second half of 2007, it hovered in the mid- to low 30 
percent range (The Gallup Poll 2007). 
Several policy implications emerge from these constraints for United States 
foreign policy. First, in the post-Iraq context, the hard power option is simply 
less available to the Bush administration due to existing structural constraints 
at home. At present, the American military has been thinly stretched to meet 
its current commitments. With 180,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (and 
the prospect uncertain for a significant drawdown any time soon), with 
500,000 military needed for training and infrastructure in the United States, 
with the reserves and national guard units spread out as well, and with more 
than 150,000 extra American troops scattered across the globe, the prospects 
of intervening in another state appear remote (Lutt\vak 2004). Most American 
military officials will privately acknowledge this point as well. In this sense, se-
rious military actions against North Korea or Iran over their nuclear ambi-
tions are not viable. To be sure, American air power might be utilized against 
Iran, but, as Hersh has reported (2008), this option does not meet with much 
enthusiasm with officials at the Pentagon (expect for the Air Force) or those 
in intelligence. Second, the American defense budget (total defense and vet-
eran outlays) at about $600 billion for FY2007 also serves as a structural con-
straint on actions abroad. It is doubtful that there is congressional or public 
support fo r widening the American budget deficit to support increased de-
fense spending. This is particularly so in view of competing and insistent de-
mands for expenditure on health care, education, and reconstruction in the 
wake of hurricane Katrina and with the continuing opposition to U.S. military 
involvement in Iraq. While there may be resources for continuing Iraq fund-
ing as long as U.S. forces are there, there is unlikely to be strong congressional 
support for funding other military interventions. 
Third, and relatedly, both Democratic and Republican members of Con-
gress are likely to serve as a brake on new unilateralism and provide another 
incentive to seek to repair transatlantic divisions. Even prior to the Democrats 
gaining control of both chambers of Congress in the November 2006 elec-
tions, there were clear signs of congressional assertiveness on U.S.-European 
relations. While Republican members of the House of Representatives may 
have continued to support a more assertive and unilateral role for the United 
States in global affairs than the Senate prior to 2006, both chambers were 
skeptical of any attempt by the Bush administration to widen its agenda. It 
was the Senate, though, that was the most doubtful. In particular, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee has (and continues) to express concerns about 
the administration's overaJl policy direction. Senator Richard Lugar (R. IN), 
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the Republican committee chair at the time (and now ranking minority mem-
ber) was a persistent critic of the Bush administration's unilateral ism and reg-
ularly called upon the administration to be more open with its plans and to 
pursue greater multilateral effort on Iraq and elsewhere. During Condoleezza 
Rice's confirmation hearing, Lugar pointedly calJed for "repairing alliances 
with longstanding friends in Europe" (U.S. Congress 2005). The ranking 
Democrat (at the time), Senator Joe Biden (D. DE), was equally blunt. He told 
Rice that "relations with many of our oldest friends are quite frankly scraping 
the bottom right now" (U.S. Congress 2005). These sentiments were echoed 
by other prominent Republican senators, Senator Chuck Hagel (R. NE) and 
Senator John McCain (R. AZ), and the leaders of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee, Senators Pat Roberts (R. KS) and Jay Rockefeller (D. WV). 
Under Democratic control after the 2006 elections, congressional criticism 
of the Bush administration's policies has been amplified in both chambers, 
whether over relations with Europe or with other parts of the world. The ini-
tiatives launched by the House and Senate Democratic leaderships-setting a 
deadline for American involvement in Iraq, seeking action on global warming, 
and utilizing international institutions and allies more fully-comport well 
with European views and to some extent have constrained the decision lati-
tude of the Bush administration. The Bush administration has largely resisted 
these efforts and has now wielded the veto pen on an Iraq funding bill , but 
congressional stances (including seeking to limit funding levels for Iraq or 
elsewhere) will continue to constrict the range of presidential actions. 
Fourth, American public opinion on foreign policy is likely to constrain the 
Bush administration and encourage more policy cooperation with Europe 
(and elsewhere). Although President Bush successfully utilized anti-terrorism 
as the principal theme of his reelection campaign in November 2004, the 
American public remains skeptical of Bush's unilateralist foreign policy ap-
proach, especially in light of the difficulties in Iraq. Significantly, too, the pub-
lic largely rejected the anti-terrorism approach in the 2006 congressional elec-
tions, instead voting against the Iraq war in large numbers. The result was 
Democratic control of each chamber of Congress. Furthermore, the public 
continues to support muhilateralism and international institutions to address 
global problems. 
To be sure, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the rallying of the Ameri-
can public behind the president gave the administration wide latitude on both 
multilateral and unilateral options dealing with terrorism. Both of those ef-
fects have now largely evaporated. The public's support for multilateral efforts 
has been repeatedly emphasized (Global Views 2004; Page with Bouton 2006) 
and Bush's approval rating continued to decline. By July 2005, only a third of 
the American public believed that the United States is "winning the war 
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against terrorism" (Carlson 2005), and by October and November 2005, 54 
percent of the American people agreed that it was "a mistake ... sending 
troops to Iraq" (Jones 2005b). By late May 2007,76 percent of Americans saw 
things as going very badly in Iraq, and 61 percent of the public judged that the 
United States should not have pursued military actio:-~ against Iraq (Sussman 
2007). In such a difficult domestic political environment, the Bush adminis-
tration has little room for maneuver on foreign policy, and the administration 
thus increasingly needs to reach out to its allies and friends with new initia-
tives that invite collaboration and, in turn, close the action gap with Europe. 
Constraints on Europe 
Similarly, Europe faces some domestic and international constraints likely 
to encourage narrowing the action or policy gap with the United States. On 
the domestic level writ large within Europe, whether the European Union can 
formulate a meaningful common foreign and security policy remains a vexed 
question. While the attempt to ratify a new European constitution has appar-
ently been abandoned, a common EU foreign policy front to counterbalance 
that of the United States cannot be completely dismissed. Given the uncer-
tainties currently over the direction of European integration, the European 
states and the European Union will more likely be compelled to face the real-
ity of American global power and presence. In doing so, they will likely need 
to accommodate some American policies, even as they may seek to modify 
them. Senator Biden made the same point colorfully and bluntly after visiting 
Europe in January 2005. At Condoleezza Rice's confirmation hearings, the 
senior committee Democrat shouted out for the benefit of Europeans, "[g]et 
over it. Get over it. President Bush is our president for the next four years. So 
get over it and start to act in your interest, Europe" (U.S. Congress 2005). 
The need for accommodation was given some impetus with the incipient 
success of the administration's democracy initiative in the Middle East and 
beyond at the beginning of its second term. While a fully functioning democ-
racy in Iraq continues to be a substantial uncertainty, the fact that the post-
Saddam state and civil society showed some progress toward democracy, how-
ever slight, probably serves as a prod to many European states. Being part of 
that initiative allows Europe to exercise some influence. After all, reasonably 
democratic elections have been held in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian 
Authority. Some movement has occurred with the removal of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon, and other democratic actions may be forthcoming in Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. And European states played a part in these initiatives. The 
existence of nascent policy progress should be an incentive for Europe and 
America to work more closely together to close the action gap and to begin to 
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promote abroad those political values more compatible with their collective 
views. 
Cooperation between Europe and America over Iran and its nuclear efforts 
reflects the kind of closure of the action gap that is needed. Iro nically, the 
more President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran continues to pursue the nu-
clear issue and make inflammatory statements about Israel and the Ho locaust, 
the more he assists in narrowing the conceptual and action gap between Eu-
rope a nd America on this issue, and the easier it will be for the United States 
and its European partners, particularly Britain, Germany, and France, to per-
suade the UN Security Council to act if diplomacy fails. By the end of 2005, 
leaders from Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union condemned 
these Iranian statements and moved toward a tougher stance toward Iran 
(Parillo 2006). While concerted UN actions remain rather uncertain two years 
later, U.S.-European cooperation continues on the Iran ian question, as more 
sanctio ns were imposed by March 2007 and still more may be in the wo rks. In 
September 2007, several countries (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, 
France, and Germany), with the support of the European Union agreed to 
delay fu rther sanctions against Iran until November 2007. At the same time, 
Javier Solana warned that "we can't wait forever" to see progress in interna-
tio nal negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. Otherwise, he continued, 
there is "a real risk" of addi tional sanctions (Brand 2007). In all, intra-alliance 
negotiations and policy cooperatio n appear to have become much easier and 
mo re continuous and represent mechanisms for closing conceptual and pol-
icy gaps between Europe and America. 
Ano ther incentive for European accommodation with the United Sta tes in 
the current environment is the need to serve as a limiting or moderating in-
fluence to U.S. power. This mediating role toward American power has lo ng 
been fa miliar to Britain, if not to the rest of Europe. Beginning at the end of 
Wo rld War II , Britain sought both to temper American power and policy and 
to serve as an intermediary between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
While not always successful in doing so, it did introduce an important con-
straint fo r the United States to consider in its policy pursuits. In a sense, th is 
kind o f incentive goes to the heart of two important-and linked-questio ns 
for Europe: what is the best tactic for influencing America, and should Europe 
still seek to tie its political fortunes to the United States? Put differently, is it 
better to challenge a state or its policy (albeit partially) as a way to exercise in-
fluence? With the hard power differential favoring the United States and the 
soft power differential favoring Europe in the global arena presently, this is a 
genuine dilemma. On balance, it seems likely that Europe will want to remain 
tied to the United States in an effort to influence some of its key policies by 
embracing rather than continuing to confront them. 
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A European decision to remain tethered to the United States may have got-
ten a little easier with the change in leadership in several key European stales 
within the last two years. With the election of Angela Merkel as German chan-
cellor, Nicolas Sarkozy as the French president, and Gordon Brown replacing 
Tony Blair as British prime minister, the "pragmatists" have replaced "vision-
aries" in Europe, as one assessment put it (Schofield 2007). Analysts view these 
new leaders as more interested in solving problems and less interested in en-
gaging in confrontations with the United States. Their presence in leadership 
positions may give us a good measure of how much past differences in the 
transatlantic relationship turned on personalities and how much on policy 
differences. Furthermore, as a new president takes over in January 2009, these 
new European leaders will have a new administration fully prepared to start 
anew in addressing transatlantic ties. 
A final incentive to close the policy gap with America is Europe's general 
commitment to multilateralism to solve global problems, and particularly 
over the issue of terrorism. Not only does the modal view of the European 
Union embrace multilateralism as a standard for foreign policy action and as 
a means of gajning strength through numbers, this approach may also be the 
only viable means for creating a rule-based international order. While the 
Bush administration may well be a reluctant partner in such multilateral ef-
forts, Europe as a whole has a collective incentive for pursuing just such an 
outcome. Furthermore, with the missteps by the Bush administration within 
global institutions over the past several years, the acrimony that it generated 
with its traditional friends, and the constraints on its foreign policy options at 
home and abroad, the administration may now be willing to follow the Euro-
pean lead in a way that it would not have done at the onset of the Iraqi inva-
sion. The recommendations by The Iraq Study Group Report (2006) on a 
diplomatic initiative as "the way forward" to address the Iraq question would 
be exactly the kind of effort that would be a way to bridge United States and 
European differences on multilateralism. 
The Road Ahead: Some Practical Steps 
Let me conclude by both recognizing some lingering conceptual gaps between 
Europe and America and by discussing some practical steps to close the action 
gap between these global actors. 
Neither the United States nor Europe is likely to abandon its fundamental 
tenets on foreign policy. It is unlikely that the United States under Bush will 
forego the unilateral option or even its preemptive option (Gaddis 2005), and 
it is equally unlikely that all European states will abandon their commitment 
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to international institutions or the pursuit of a more rule-based interna tio nal 
o rder. Even so, the road ahead in European-American relations does not ap-
pear as rocky as it did a few years previously. Nevertheless, there are som e 
practical steps that each side might undertake that may improve cooperatio n 
in the years ahead. Some are already underway, but more could be done. 
As an example, John Lewis Gaddis (2005) has captured the essential im-
pera tive fo r the Bush administration to exercise greater tact in its dealings 
with other countries. Gaddis is surely right in offering this advice. The ad-
ministra tion needs to reduce its swagger, both in its step and in its rheto ric in 
discussing terrorism ("either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists;' 
fo r example). While this prescription is easy to make, it is much harder to im-
plement fo r an administration that views any concession as a sign of weak-
ness. Arguably, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has had more success 
than Secreta ry of State Colin Powell in offering a new d iplomatic approach. 
The resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his replace-
ment by the noticeably less abrasive Robert Gates also appears to be a positive 
step, as does the abandonment of the rhetorical affronts of a few years ago 
("freedom fries" rather than "French fr ies" and the demarcation of Europe 
into "Old Europe" and "New Europe"). Equally important, the Bush admin-
istratio n might seek to evoke, no t impose, its policy on its allies, much in the 
way that it seeks to evoke democracy abroad. At the very least, it might move 
toward policies that would invite the Europeans to join the United States in 
policy pursuits, rather than issuing policy d icta that can only foster resent-
ment. In following this approach, the Bush administration will have a better 
chance of closing the foreign policy action gap, if not the conceptual gap, with 
its European fr iends. 
European policymakers might fo llow Gaddis's prescription as well. As sat-
isfying as it may be in the short run, some of the anti-Bush rhetoric is exces-
sive and ultimately redundant in terms of addressing the very serious issue of 
internatio nal terrorism. Such rhetoric does not connote an appropriate level 
of tact among friends (or even adversaries), and it, too, sours the relationship, 
in much the same way as Bush's Texas swagger. Similarly, the European states 
must be equally willing to embrace some compromises on policy. While Eu-
ropean policymakers need not yield on principle, adopting more nuanced 
policy options might be mo re practical. With respect to U.S. policymaking to-
ward Europe {and elsewhere), President Bush might follow candidate Bush 
when, in his debate with Vice President AI Gore in 2000, he called for an 
America n fo reign policy with more "humility." And European policymakers 
may do the same in turn . 
In additio n, both Europe and the United States might profit from recog-
nizing mutually beneficial interdependence. Drozdiak (2007) reminds us of 
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the ample goodwill and interdependence that still ex.ist between Europe and 
America in several key areas. These connections could and should be given 
more substantial recognition and utilized to bolster and stabilize future U.S.-
European ties. Drozdiak notes that while some anti-American sentiment ex-
ists in Europe, such sentiments have not achieved mainstream acceptability. 
Candidates favorable to the United States have won elections in key nations, 
as noted earlier. In addition, Europeans continue to seek job and career op-
portunities in the United States (and vice versa), and America continues to be 
admired by many Europeans. Equally, without dismissing India and China as 
emerging economic powers, Europe and America remain "the twin turbines 
of the global economy," with as much as 60 percent of trade and investment 
worldwide, despite the press of globalization. This tie cements transatlantic 
interdependence. Third, America's next president, whether Democrat or Re-
publican, has a real opportunity to mend the relationship and build for the fu-
ture, if, as Drozdiak concludes, "he or she can infuse a new sense of purpose 
and destiny" into the transatlantic relationship. 
Tensions between America and European states are, of course, not new. Re-
call Henry Kissinger's book, A Troubled Partnership (1965). The issue that he 
dealt with over forty years ago is the same that confronts us presently. Then, 
as now, the Atlantic relationship had its troubles, but both parties found a way 
to make the relationship work. It can again. 
Notes 
I. To be sure, Snyder uses the United States and some European states to illustrate 
these different theoretical approaches, but he does not place either of the countries (or 
set of countries) solely in one theoretical location. 
2. Once again, I reiterate the risks and dangers of grouping all of Europe or even 
the European Union together. My assessment nevertheless generaiJy depicts the modal 
view of these countries. 
3. For a fuller discussion of the evolution of Bush's approach, and upon which I 
draw here, see McCormick (2004: 189-223; 2005: 21(}-26). 
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